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Abstract
We consider the problem of optimal charging of plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs). We treat this problem as a multi-agent game,
where vehicles/agents are heterogeneous since they are subject to possibly different constraints. Under the assumption that
electricity price is affine in total demand, we show that, for any finite number of heterogeneous agents, the PEV charging
control game admits a unique Nash equilibrium, which is the optimizer of an auxiliary minimization program. We are also
able to quantify the asymptotic behaviour of the price of anarchy for this class of games. More precisely, we prove that if the
parameters defining the constraints of each vehicle are drawn randomly from a given distribution, then, the value of the game
converges almost surely to the optimum of the cooperative problem counterpart as the number of agents tends to infinity. In
the case of a discrete probability distribution, we provide a systematic way to abstract agents in homogeneous groups and
show that, as the number of agents tends to infinity, the value of the game tends to a deterministic quantity.
Key words: Price of anarchy, mean field games, electric vehicles, optimal charging control, fixed-point theorems.
1 Introduction
Electric vehicles obtain some or all of their energy from
the electricity grid, and are typically referred to as
plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs). Their penetration is
expected to increase significantly, since, not only they
contribute to pollution reduction, but, by charging over
low electricity price periods, they also serve as virtual
dynamic storage, contributing to the stability of the
electric grid (see [3, 7, 20, 25]). In an electric vehicle
charging control context two cases can be distinguished.
The first case refers to a set-up where vehicles are so-
cial welfare maximizing entities and cooperate in view
of minimizing the overall population cost. Under this
setting, [8,11,13] propose iterative schemes that involve
every vehicle solving a local minimization program, and
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show convergence to the social welfare optimum. In the
second case vehicles act as selfish agents that seek to
minimize their local cost, without being concerned with
social welfare paradigms. This gives rise to multi-agent
non-cooperative games, and the main concern is the
computation of Nash equilibrium strategies. A complete
theoretical analysis is provided in [16, 19] for stochastic
continuous-time problems, but in the absense of con-
straints. The deterministic, discrete-time problem vari-
ant, was investigated in [22], and was further extended
in [15, 24] to account for the presence of constraints.
However, for any finite number of agents, an approx-
imate Nash equilibrium is computed, while the exact
Nash one is reached only in the limiting case where
the number of agents tends to infinity. The recent work
of [23] overcomes this issue under the assumption that
vehicles are aware of the way the total population con-
sumption affects the price that drives their behaviour.
One challenge associated with the aforementioned
stream of literature is that there is no common aware-
ness on how the resulting Nash equilibrium solution
is related to the associated social welfare optimum.
In this paper we follow a pricing set-up similar to the
seminal paper by [1], and account for constraint hetero-
geneity by assuming that the parameters defining the
constraints of each vehicle are drawn randomly from a
given distribution. We consider a multi-stage variant of
the problem, however, we assume the price is an affine
function of the total consumption. Under this set-up,
our paper provides the following contributions:
Preprint submitted to Automatica 18 October 2018
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(1) We quantify, to the best of our knowledge for the
first time, the limiting value of the price of anarchy [18]
for this class of games. The price of anarchy provides
the means to quantify the efficiency of Nash equilibria,
and is defined as the ratio between the worst-case value
of the game achieved by a Nash equilibrium (in our set-
ting there is a unique one) and the social optimum. We
prove that as the number of agents tends to infinity this
ratio tends to one for almost any choice of the random
heterogeneity parameters (Theorem 2). This result ex-
tends [22] to the case of heterogeneous agents that are
subject to constraints, without resorting to approximate
Nash equilibria and primal-dual algorithms as in [21].
As a byproduct we show that, for any finite number of
possibly heterogeneous agents, the PEV charging con-
trol game admits a unique Nash equilibrium, which is the
minimizer of an auxiliary minimization program (Propo-
sition 4). This is due to the fact that the underlying
game is potential [12], however, our proof line is different
and is based on fixed-point theoretic results. This result
opens the road for the use of iterative algorithms for de-
centralized computation of Nash equilibria [11,13,23].
(2) We provide the discrete time counterpart of the
mean-field game theoretic approach in [16], treating
heterogeneity in a probabilistic manner, thus comple-
menting the deterministic approaches of [15, 21, 23].
In particular, we show that if the distribution of the
random parameters that render agents’ constraints
heterogeneous is discrete, agents can be abstracted in
homogeneous groups and, for almost any realization of
the random heterogeneity parameters, as the number of
agents tends to infinity, the value of the game tends to
a deterministic quantity (Theorem 3).
It should be noted that our set-up exhibits similarities
with multi-participant market investigations in [4–6,17].
In particular, it is shown in [5] that under current day-
ahead operations participants have the incentive to self-
dispatch, and the resulting social welfare market clearing
prices are not practically viable. This is not in contrast
with our results, since we show that Nash equilibria and
social optima tend to coincide only in the limiting case
of an infinite number of agents, and may differ for finite
populations. Moreover, we consider a stylized architec-
ture without including a distribution network model.
Section 2 introduces the non-cooperative PEV charging
control game and its social welfare counterpart. Section
3 quantifies the price of anarchy for the limiting case of
an infinite number of agents. In Section 4, we investigate
the effect heterogeneity has in the value of the game,
while Section 5 provides some directions for future work.
2 Electric vehicle charging control problem
2.1 Cooperative set-up
We first consider the case of m PEVs that seek to de-
termine their charging profile along some discrete time
horizon [0, h−1] of arbitrary length h ∈ N so as to mini-
mize the total charging cost for the entire fleet. This cor-
responds to a cooperative set-up that is likely to occur
when vehicles belong to the same managing entity. To
this end, let H = {0, 1, . . . , h − 1} and I = {1, . . . ,m}.
Consider the following optimization program:
min
{xit∈R}t∈H
i∈I
∑
t∈H
pt
(∑
i∈I
xit + x0t
)2
(1)
subject to:
∑
t∈H
xit = γi, for all i ∈ I, (2)
xit ∈ [xit, xit], for all t ∈ H, i ∈ I, (3)
where xit ∈ R is the charging rate of vehicle i, i ∈ I, at
time t, t ∈ H, and pt ≥ 0 is an electricity price coefficient
at time t. For each t ∈ H, we denote by x0t ≥ 0 the non-
PEV demand which, for a fixed number of PEVs m, is
treated as constant and not as an optimization variable
in the optimization programs below. Similarly to [22,24],
for all t ∈ H, we assume that limm→∞ x0t/m = xˆ0t is
constant, allowing the non-PEV demand to grow linearly
in the number of agents m if xˆ0t 6= 0.
The price of electricity is given by pt(
∑
i∈I x
it + x0t),
and is assumed to depend linearly on the total PEV
and non-PEV demand through pt. Dependency of price
on the PEV demand is affine due the presence of x0t.
Our choice for an affine price function is a simplifica-
tion over [1, 13, 22] where convex monotone increasing
functions are allowed, and is motivated by [15], where
an affine function is also employed, as well as by the nu-
merical investigations of [14] (in the corresponding theo-
retical analysis more general functions are allowed). The
slope of this function encodes the inverse of the price
elasticity of demand, and is motivated by the fact that
marginal prices in lossless unconstrained energy systems
are affine functions of the total production/demand [6].
The objective function in (1) encodes the total electric-
ity cost over [0, h − 1]. Constraint (2) represents a pre-
scribed charging level γi ∈ R, γi > 0, to be reached by
each vehicle i at the end of the considered time horizon
H, whereas (3) imposes minimum (xit ∈ R, xit ≥ 0) and
maximum (xit ∈ R, xit <∞) limits, respectively, on xit.
For all i ∈ I, let xi = [xi0, . . . , xi(h−1)]> ∈ R|H|, where
| · | denotes the cardinality of its argument. Let also
f : R|H|×Rm|H| → R be such that, for all i ∈ I, for any
(xi, x−i) ∈ Rm|H|,
f(xi, x−i) =
∑
t∈H
xitpt
(∑
j∈I
j 6=i
xjt + xit + x0t
)
, (4)
where by x−i ∈ R(m−1)|H| we imply a vector including
the decision variables of all vehicles except vehicle i (re-
call that x0t is constant for any fixed m and hence not
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included in these vectors). Moreover, for all i ∈ I, let
Xi =
{
xi ∈ R|H| :
∑
t∈H
xit = γi and
xit ∈ [xit, xit], for all t ∈ H}, (5)
denote the constraint set corresponding to vehicle
i. Let x = (x1, . . . , xm) and X = X1 × . . . × Xm,
and consider f0 : Rm|H| → R such that f0(x) =∑
t∈H x
0tpt(
∑
j∈I x
jt + x0t), which represents the cost
of non-PEV demand. We can then rewrite (1)-(3) as
P : min
{xi∈Xi}i∈I
f0(x) +
∑
i∈I
f(xi, x−i). (6)
and refer to its optimal solution as social optimum. Note
that local utility functions that depend only on the de-
cision vector xi of each vehicle i, i ∈ I, and are possibly
different per vehicle, can be incorporated in P by means
of an epigraphic reformulation (see [8]).
Assumption 1 Fix any m ≥ 1 and let γi > 0, i ∈ I.
a) The sets Xi, i ∈ I, are nonempty and compact.
b) The price coefficient satisfies pt > 0, for all t ∈ H.
The second part of Assumption 1 is only needed for the
proof of Theorem 2, but is naturally satisfied in situa-
tions of practical relevance.
Denote the set of social optima M of P by
M = arg min
{xi∈Xi}i∈I
f0(x) +
∑
i∈I
f(xi, x−i). (7)
Note that (7) involves minimizing a continuous function
(as an effect of being convex), over a compact set (which
is convex) due to Assumption 1. As such, the minimum
is achieved due to Weierstrass’ theorem in [2, Proposi-
tion A.8, p. 625]. Under a similar reasoning all subse-
quent minimization problems are well defined. It should
be emphasized that f0 is introduced to facilitate the com-
pact representation of (1) in (6) and captures the cost
of non-PEV demand, which does not appear in the gam-
ing formulation of the next subsection where, similarly
to [22,24], agents’ pay-off functions are given by (4).
2.2 Non-cooperative set-up
We now consider the case where the m vehicles act
in a non-cooperative manner. In particular, each vehi-
cle/agent i, i ∈ I, aims at determining a charging profile
xi that minimizes its pay-off function f(xi, x−i), as this
is given by (4), which depends on its own decision vector
xi and on the other agents decision vector x−i, subject
to a local constraint xi ∈ Xi. We say that for all i, i ∈ I,
the tuple (xi, x−i) is a Nash equilibrium of the game, if
each agent i, given the strategies x−i of the other agents,
has no interest in changing its own strategy xi.
Definition 1 For all i ∈ I, each agent i has a pay-off
function f(·, x−i) and a constraint set Xi. The set of
Nash equilibriaN of the non-cooperative game is given by
N =
{
x ∈ X : f(xi, x−i) ≤ f(ζi, x−i)
for all ζi ∈ Xi, i ∈ I}, (8)
where x = (x1, . . . , xm) and X = X1 × . . .×Xm.
Since each agent has a pay-off function of the same struc-
ture, the resulting game is a potential game [12,28].
3 Nash equilibria versus social optima
3.1 Nash equilibria as fixed-points
The results of this subsection do not require the pay-off
function to exhibit the form of (4) and are more general;
in fact each agent could have a different pay-off func-
tion, convex with respect to the decision vector of the
particular agent, but possibly non-differentiable.
For each i, i ∈ I, consider the mappings T i : X → Xi
and T˜ i : X → Xi, defined such that, for any x ∈ X,
T i(x) = arg min
zi∈Xi
‖zi − xi‖2 (9)
subject to
f(zi, x−i) ≤ min
ζi∈Xi
f(ζi, x−i),
T˜ i(x) = arg min
zi∈Xi
f(zi, x−i) + c‖zi − xi‖2, (10)
for any c > 0. Note that both mappings are well defined
since both the minimizers of (9) and (10) are unique. As
for the mapping in (9), a tie-break rule is implemented to
select, in case f(·, x−i) admits multiple minimizers over
Xi, the one closer to xi with respect to the Euclidean
norm. In contrast, the mapping T˜ i in (10) includes in the
objective function an additional term weighted by c > 0,
which penalizes the deviations from the current decision
vector xi and makes it strictly convex. Notice that, with
a slight abuse of notation, by T i(x) and T˜ i(x), we imply
the minimizers of (9) and (10), respectively, and not the
corresponding (singleton due to uniqueness) sets.
Define also the mappings T : X → X and T˜ : X →
X, such that their components are given by T i and T˜ i,
respectively, for i ∈ I, i.e., T = (T 1, . . . , Tm) and T˜ =
(T˜ 1, . . . , T˜m). They can be equivalently written as
T (x) = arg min
z∈X
∑
i∈I
‖zi − xi‖2 (11)
subject to
f(zi, x−i) ≤ min
ζi∈Xi
f(ζi, x−i), ∀i ∈ I,
T˜ (x) = arg min
z∈X
∑
i∈I
[
f(zi, x−i) + c‖zi − xi‖2]. (12)
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The set of fixed points for T and T˜ is given by
FT =
{
x ∈ X : x = T (x)}, (13)
F
T˜
=
{
x ∈ X : x = T˜ (x)}. (14)
We first show that the set of Nash equilibria N and the
set of fixed-points FT of the mapping T in (11) coincide.
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1.a), N = FT .
Proof 1) N ⊆ FT : Fix any x ∈ N . For each i ∈ I, de-
note x by (xi, x−i). The fact that x ∈ N implies that xi
is a minimizer of f(·, x−i), for all i ∈ I, indeed accord-
ing to (8), f(xi, x−i) will be no greater than the values
that f may take if evaluated at (ζi, x−i), for any ζi ∈ Xi,
i.e., f(xi, x−i) ≤ f(ζi, x−i), for all ζi ∈ Xi. The last
statement can be equivalently written as f(xi, x−i) ≤
minζi∈Xi f(ζi, x−i) which means that x satisfies the in-
equality in (11). Moreover, x is also optimal for the objec-
tive function in (11), since it results in zero cost. Hence,
x = T (x), which by (13) implies that x ∈ FT .
2) FT ⊆ N : Fix any x ∈ FT . By the definition of
FT , and due to the inequality in (11) that is embed-
ded in the definition of T , we have that for all i ∈ I,
f(xi, x−i) ≤ minζi∈Xi f(ζi, x−i). The last statement im-
plies that xi is a minimizer of f(·, x−i) over Xi, and
hence f(xi, x−i) ≤ f(ζi, x−i), ∀ζi ∈ Xi, ∀i ∈ I, which
due to (8) implies that x ∈ N . 2
We next show that the set of fixed-points FT of T in (13)
and the set of fixed-points F
T˜
of T˜ in (14) coincide.
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 1.a), FT = FT˜ .
Proof 1) FT ⊆ FT˜ : Fix any x ∈ FT . By the definition of
FT , and due to the inequality in (11) that is embedded in
the definition of T , we have that for all i ∈ I, f(xi, x−i) ≤
minζi∈Xi f(ζi, x−i). The last statement implies that xi is
a minimizer of f(·, x−i) over Xi, and hence f(xi, x−i) ≤
f(ζi, x−i), ∀ζi ∈ Xi, ∀i ∈ I. Therefore, we would also
have that f(xi, x−i) ≤ f(ζi, x−i)+c‖ζi−xi‖2, ∀ζi ∈ Xi,
∀i ∈ I. The latter, due to (10) implies that xi = T i(x),
for all i ∈ I, and hence x ∈ F
T˜
.
2) F
T˜
⊆ FT : Fix any x ∈ FT˜ . By the definition of FT˜ ,
and due to (10), the latter implies that xi = T˜ i(x) for all
i ∈ I. We thus have that, for all i ∈ I,
f(xi, x−i) ≤ f(ζi, x−i) + c‖ζi − xi‖2, ∀ζi ∈ Xi. (15)
If in addition xi minimizes f(·, x−i) overXi, for all i ∈ I,
then xi would satisfy the inequality in (9), while resulting
in zero cost. We would thus have that xi = T i(x), for all
i ∈ I, and hence x ∈ FT .
To show that, for all i ∈ I, xi minimizes f(·, x−i) over
Xi, assume for the sake of contradiction that this is not
the case and there exists zi ∈ Xi, zi 6= xi, such that
f(zi, x−i) < f(xi, x−i). For any α ∈ (0, 1), let ζi =
αzi + (1− α)xi. Note that by convexity of Xi, ζi ∈ Xi,
whereas by convexity of f(·, x−i) with respect to its first
argument we have that
f(ζi, x−i) ≤ αf(zi, x−i) + (1− α)f(xi, x−i), (16)
which, by rearranging some terms, can be rewritten as
f(ζi, x−i) + α
(
f(xi, x−i)− f(zi, x−i))
≤ f(xi, x−i). (17)
Note that, since f(xi, x−i)−f(zi, x−i) > 0, ‖zi−xi‖ > 0
and c > 0, there exists α ∈ (0, 1) such that
α(f(xi, x−i)− f(zi, x−i)) > cα2‖zi − xi‖2
= c‖ζi − xi‖2, (18)
where the equality follows from the definition of ζi (note
that ζi depends on the choice of α). By (17) and (18) we
have that there exists α such that
f(ζi, x−i) + c‖ζi − xi‖2 < f(xi, x−i). (19)
The last statement, together with (15), leads to a contra-
diction, showing that xi minimizes f(·, x−i) over Xi. 2
An alternative proof for a result similar to Proposition 2
was provided in [11, Proposition 3], relying, however, on
the additional assumption that the objective functions
involved are differentiable. The following corollary is a
direct consequence of Propositions 1 and 2.
Corollary 1 Under Assumption 1.a), N = F
T˜
.
3.2 Nash equilibria as social optima of an auxiliary
problem
We show that the set of Nash equilibria N defined in
(8) coincides with the set of optimizers of an auxiliary
minimization program. To this end, for all i ∈ I, let
Pa : min{xi∈Xi}i∈I f0(x) +
∑
i∈I
[
f(xi, x−i) + fa(xi)
]
,
(20)
where fa(x
i) =
∑
t∈H p
t(xit)2. Problem Pa is a cen-
tralized convex optimization program. Let T˜a =(
T˜ 1a , . . . , T˜
m
a
)
(see also equation (5) in [11]), where, for
all i ∈ I, for any c > 0,
T˜ ia(x) = arg min
zi∈Xi
f0(z
i, x−i) + f(zi, x−i) + fa(zi)
+
∑
k∈I
k 6=i
[
f(xk, (zi, x−{k,i})) + fa(xk)
]
+ 2c‖zi − xi‖2. (21)
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where f(xk, (zi, x−{k,i})) =
∑
t∈H x
ktpt(
∑
k∈I,k 6=i x
kt+
zit + x0t), for all k ∈ I, k 6= i due to (4), , encoding the
fact that the decision vector zi of agent i appears also in
the terms with k 6= i. By x−{k,i} we mean the elements
of x but for the ones corresponding to agents k and i. By
f0(z
i, x−i) we imply f0(x1, . . . , xi−1, zi, xi+1, . . . , xm) =∑
t∈H x
0tpt(
∑
k∈I,k 6=i x
kt+ zit+x0t). We then have the
following result, adapted to the notation of the current
paper, due to Corollary 1 of [11].
Proposition 3 (Corollary 1 of [11]) Under Assumption
1.a), the set of minimizers of Pa coincides with the set
of fixed points of the mapping T˜a.
Proposition 4 Under Assumption 1.a), the set of Nash
equilibria N , and minimizers of Pa coincide, i.e.,
N = arg min
{xi∈Xi}i∈I
f0(x) +
∑
i∈I
[
f(xi, x−i) + fa(xi)
]
.
(22)
Proof By the definition of T˜ ia(x) in (21) we have that
T˜ ia(x) = arg min
zi∈Xi
[∑
t∈H
zitpt
(∑
j∈I
j 6=i
xjt + zit + x0t
)
+
∑
t∈H
zitpt
(∑
k∈I
k 6=i
xkt + x0t
)
+
∑
t∈H
pt(zit)2
]
+ 2c‖zi − xi‖2, (23)
where the first term in the summation corresponds to
f(zi, x−i) as defined in (4), the second term corresponds
to f0(z
i, x−i) +
∑
k∈I,k 6=i f(x
k, (zi, x−{k,i})) where all
terms that do not depend on the decision vector zi have
been dropped as the leave the minimizer unaffected, and
the third term is fa(z
i) (fa(x
k) is constant and has been
dropped). Rearranging terms, we obtain
T˜ ia(x) = arg min
zi∈Xi
2
∑
t∈H
zitpt
(∑
j∈I
j 6=i
xjt + zit + x0t
)
+ 2c‖zi − xi‖2
= arg min
zi∈Xi
f(zi, x−i) + c‖zi − xi‖2 = T˜ i(x), (24)
where in the second equality we used (4) and rescaled the
objective by a factor of 2, since this does not affect the
resulting minimizer. The last equality follows from the
definition of T˜ i in (10). Equation (24) implies that T˜ ia
and T˜ i are identical. The latter, together with Corollary
1 and Proposition 3, concludes the proof. 2
If we impose also Assumption 1.b), the objective func-
tion in (20) becomes strictly convex due to the presence
of the auxiliary term. Therefore, it admits a unique min-
imizer and, as a result of Proposition 4, the game of Sec-
tion 2.2 admits a unique Nash equilibrium. By Corollary
1 this in turn implies that the mapping T˜ has a unique
fixed-point. The uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium is
due to (22), which relies on the particular structure of
the objective functions in (4); for general convex pay-off
functions (22), however, this might not be the case.
The interpretation of (20) is that the auxiliary term acts
like a variance penalty in regularization methods (sim-
ilar to overfitting prevention in regression), promoting
least norm solutions, thus implicitly enforcing unifor-
mity in the agents’ decisions, and shall not be related
to quadratic penalty terms in augmented Lagrangian
methods. The relative importance of this term becomes
negligible as the number of agents increases.
3.3 Price of anarchy
In this subsection we show that as the number of agents
increases, the Nash equilibrium of the game in Section
2.2 achieves the social welfare optimum.
For our analysis we assume that the price coefficients
{pt}t∈H are deterministic quantities satisfying Assump-
tion 1.b), whereas the consumption level γi, i ∈ I in (2)
and the upper and lower limits in (3) are random vari-
ables, extracted according to a given probability distri-
bution. We impose the following assumption on the infi-
nite sequence of random vectors {γi, xi, xi}i≥1, where
xi = [xi0, . . . , xi(h−1)], xi = [xi0, . . . , xi(h−1)].
Assumption 2 Let {γi, xi, xi}i≥1 be an infinite
sequence of random vectors on a probability space
(Ω,F ,P) 3 . We assume that
(1) {γi, xi, xi}i≥1 are a sequence of independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) random vectors.
(2) γ1 is a positive random variable, while x1, x1 are
non-negative random vectors.
(3) E[γ1] <∞ andE[(γ1)2] <∞, whereE[·] denotes the
expectation operator associated with the probability
measure P.
Due to the i.i.d. requirement of Assumption 2.a), the
statement of part b) would also hold for all γi, and
{xi, xi}, i ≥ 1. By Assumptions 2.a)-b), E[γi] > 0, for
any i ≥ 1. We employ the following law of large numbers
type of argument, and write that an event holds (P-a.s.)
when it holds with probability one with respect to P.
Theorem 1 ( [26], Chapter IV, §3, Theorem 3)
Let {yj}j≥1 be a sequence of i.i.d. random variables
such that E[|y1|] < ∞. For any given index set Jm with
3 Note that if {γi, xi, xi}, i ≥ 1, is defined on a given
set, by P we denote the probability measure induced on the
infinite cartesian product of these sets. For more details on
the mathematical construction of such a measure the reader
is referred to [27] (Section 2.4.1, p. 29).
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cardinality |Jm| = m, we then have that
lim
m→∞
1
m
∑
j∈Jm
yj = E[y1], (P-a.s.) (25)
Consider any given index setH with |H| = h, h ≥ 1, and
let yt ∈ R, yt ≥ 0, for all t ∈ H. Let also y¯ ∈ R such that∑
t∈H y
t = y¯. Due to norm equivalence we have that
(‖y‖1/
√
h) ≤ ‖y‖2 ≤ ‖y‖1, where y = (y1, . . . , yh), i.e.,
y¯2
h
≤
∑
t∈H
(yt)2 ≤ y¯2. (26)
which we exploit in the proof of Theorem 2. Denote by
Fm(x) = f0(x) +
∑
i∈I f(x
i, x−i) the objective function
of P, and let Fma (x) =
∑
i∈I fa(x
i). The objective func-
tion of Pa in (20) can be thus written as Fm(x)+Fma (x).
We introduce the superscript m in our notation to em-
phasize the fact that the relevant objective functions cor-
respond to a set-up of m agents, since in the sequel we
will let m tend to infinity. Notice that, for any x ∈ X,
Fm(x) =
∑
t∈H
pt
(∑
i∈I
xit + x0t
)2
≥ p
∑
t∈H
(∑
i∈I
xit + x0t
)2
≥ p
∑
t∈H
(∑
i∈I
xit
)2
≥ p
(∑
i∈I γ
i
)2
h
> 0, (27)
where the first inequality is obtained by setting p =
mint∈H pt, and the second one by ommitting the non-
negative term x0t. To see the third inequality notice that∑
t∈H
(∑
i∈I x
it
)
=
∑
i∈I
(∑
t∈H x
it
)
=
∑
i∈I γ
i. The
desired inequality follows then by the left-hand side of
(26) with
∑
i∈I x
it,
∑
i∈I γ
i in place of yt and y¯, respec-
tively. The last inequality is strict, due to the fact that
p > 0 (H is a finite set) as a result of Assumption 1.b),
and the fact that γi > 0, for all i ≥ 1, due to Assump-
tion 2.a).
By [18], we have the following definition for the so called
price of anarchy, which has mainly appeared in the com-
puter science literature, mostly focused on problems
with discrete decision variables.
Definition 2 For a givenm, Fm(x?a)/F
m(x?) is defined
as the price of anarchy for the game in Section 2.2.
Note that according to the discussion below Proposi-
tion 4 the game under study admits a unique Nash equi-
librium. In the opposite case, the numerator of the ra-
tio defined as the price of anarchy shall be replaced by
maxx∈N Fm(x), where N is defined as the set of Nash
equilibria, to account for the worst-case value achieved
by a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 2 Consider Assumptions 1 and 2. Let x? ∈
X, x?a ∈ X be any minimizer of P and Pa, respectively.
We then have that
lim
m→∞
Fm(x?a)
Fm(x?)
= 1, (P-a.s.), (28)
where Fm(x?) > 0, i.e., the price of anarchy tends to 1.
Proof Let x, xa ∈ X be feasible solutions, possibly dif-
ferent, ofP and Pa, respectively. By the definition of Fm,
Fma , and since F
m(x) > 0 for any x ∈ X, we have that
Fma (xa)
Fm(x)
=
∑
t∈H p
t
∑
i∈I(x
it
a )
2∑
t∈H pt
(∑
i∈I xit + x0t
)2 . (29)
Let p = maxt∈H pt and p = mint∈H pt > 0, where the
inequality is strict due to Assumption 1.b). We have that
Fma (xa)
Fm(x)
≤ p
∑
t∈H
∑
i∈I(x
it
a )
2
p
∑
t∈H
(∑
i∈I xit + x0t
)2 . (30)
Since xita is feasible for Pa, we have that
∑
t∈H x
it
a = γ
i,
for all i ∈ I. By the right-hand side of (26) with xit, γi
in place of yt and y¯, respectively, we obtain that∑
t∈H
(xita )
2 ≤ (γi)2, for all i ∈ I. (31)
By the derivation of (27), we obtain that
∑
t∈H
(∑
i∈I
xit + x0t
)2
≥
(∑
i∈I γ
i
)2
h
. (32)
Employing (31), (32), and by exchanging the summation
order in the numerator of (30), we have that
Fma (xa)
Fm(x)
≤ ph
∑
i∈I(γ
i)2
p
(∑
i∈I γi
)2 = ph
∑
i∈I(γ
i)2
m
pm
(∑
i∈I γ
i
m
)2 . (33)
Applying Theorem 1 twice, once with γi and once with
(γi)2 in place of yi, we have that P-a.s.
lim
m→∞
∑
i∈I γ
i
m = E[γ
1]
lim
m→∞
∑
i∈I(γ
i)2
m = E[(γ
1)2]
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However, since E[γ1] > 0 and E[(γ1)2]/
(
E[γ1]
)2
< ∞
due to Assumption 2.c),
lim
m→∞
ph
∑
i∈I(γ
i)2
m
pm
(∑
i∈I γ
i
m
)2 = 0. (P-a.s.) (34)
Therefore, since (33) holds for any {γi}i∈I , we have that
lim
m→∞
Fma (xa)
Fm(x)
= 0, (P-a.s.) (35)
Let now x?, x?a ∈ X denote an optimal solution of P andPa, respectively. By optimality of x?a we thus have that
Fm(x?a) + F
m
a (x
?
a) ≤ Fm(x?) + Fma (x?). (36)
Rearranging the terms in (36), and since Fm(x?) > 0
(see discussion above Theorem 2), we obtain
Fm(x?a)− Fm(x?)
Fm(x?)
≤ F
m
a (x
?)− Fma (x?a)
Fm(x?)
≤ F
m
a (x
?)
Fm(x?)
,
(37)
where the last inequality is due to the fact that Fma (x
?
a) ≥
0. Since (35) holds for any x, xa ∈ X, it will also hold
for x = xa = x
?. Therefore, (35) and (37) lead to
lim
m→∞
Fm(x?a)− Fm(x?)
Fm(x?)
= 0, (P-a.s.) (38)
which in turn implies (28), thus concluding the proof. 2
Informally speaking, the price of anarchy quantifies the
gap between the social optimum and the value of the
non-cooperative game; Theorem 2 implies that this gap
tends to zero as the number of agents increases.
Remark 1 In Theorem 2 we used the fact that the pa-
rameters that give rise to a heterogeneous vehicle popu-
lation are random and satisfy Assumption 2. This offers
a more flexible framework to model agents’ heterogene-
ity, e.g., encoding prior information on their distribu-
tion, and is in line with the mean-field game theoretic
approach adopted in [16] for unconstrained, continuous
time quadratic games. However, if instead of Assumption
2 we assume that for all i ∈ I, γi ∈ [γ, γ] for given de-
terministic quantities γ, γ ∈ R (similarly for xi, xi) with
γ > 0, the result of Theorem 2 remains valid not proba-
bilistically, but for all γi ∈ [γ, γ]. In particular, the proof
remains unchanged but for the following modifications:
The inequalities in (33) shall be replaced by
Fma (xa)
Fm(x)
≤ ph
∑
i∈I(γ
i)2
p
(∑
i∈I γi
)2 ≤ phmγ2pm2γ2 ≤ phγ2pmγ2 , (39)
where the numerator of the second inequality follows
from
∑
i∈I(γ
i)2 ≤ mγ2 and the denominator from
(
∑
i∈I γ
i)2 ≥ m2γ2 > 0. Equation (39) leads to
limm→∞(Fma (xa)/F
m(x)) = 0 and from (36) the proof
of Theorem 2 remains unchanged, with the relevant
statements holding robustly for all γi ∈ [γ, γ], i ∈ I,
instead of P-a.s.
Note that the aggregate quantity 1m
∑
i∈I x
it exhibits
the same behaviour with the corresponding objective
functions of P and Pa in Theorem 2, since under As-
sumption 2.b) the latter are strictly convex with respect
to the agents aggregate.
To illustrate the result of Theorem 2, we performed
a numerical investigation parametric with respect to
the number of agents m. We considered a time hori-
zon h = 12, and price coefficients (p0, . . . , ph−1) =
(0.1, 1, 1.9, 2.8, 3.7, 4.6, 5.5, 6.4, 7.3, 8.2, 9.1, 10). For sim-
plicity we assumed that the probability mass is concen-
trated to the lower and upper limits xit = 0 and xit = 1
for all i ∈ I, t ∈ H (assuming normalized charging
rates) that are effectively being treated as deterministic,
whereas the charging levels γi, i ∈ I, were extracted in
an i.i.d. fashion from a uniform distribution with sup-
port [0, 12]. We consider a zero non-PEV demand, i.e.,
xˆ0t = 0 for all t ∈ H (see Section 2.1 for a definition of
xˆ0t). For each m, we performed 100 multi-extractions
of {γi}i≥1, and calculated the average of the ratio
(Fm(x?a)−Fm(x?))/Fm(x?). As shown in Figure 1, and
following (28), this ratio tends to zero as the number of
agents increases for every set of heterogeneity parame-
ters, but not necessarily in a monotone way. Note that
x?, x?a depend on the extracted {γi}i≥1; however, we
suppress this dependence in the notation for simplicity.
Figure 2 investigates the case of a non-zero normal-
ized non-PEV demand, i.e., x0t/m = xˆ0t 6= 0 (green),
and considers the normalized total consumption profile
(1/m)(
∑
i∈I x
it + x0t) = (1/m)
∑
i∈I x
it + xˆ0t obtained
by solving problem P (blue) and problem Pa (red). Here
we solved those problems by means of the iterative al-
gorithm proposed in [11], but other decentralized algo-
rithms could be employed, e.g., [13]. Both solutions have
the so called valley filling property, i.e., the PEV con-
sumption tends to compensate for the over night drop in
the non-PEV consumption. By comparison of the figure
panels, as m increases the consumption corresponding
to the Nash equilibrium tends to the social optimum, as
expected by the discussion below Remark 1.
4 Effect of heterogeneity
Define the random vectors {ξi}i≥1 = {γi, xi, xi}i≥1.
For the results of this section we assume that {ξi}i≥1
are extracted from a discrete probability distribution.
Assumption 3 Let {ξi}i≥1 = {γi, xi, xi}i≥1 be an
infinite sequence of positive, i.i.d. random variables on
a discrete probability space (Ω,F ,P). We assume that P
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Fig. 1. Relative error (Fm(x?a) − Fm(x?))/Fm(x?); “Blue
stars” correspond to the average value across 100 multi-ex-
tractions of {γi}i≥1 from a uniform distribution and xit = 0,
xit = 1 for all i ∈ I, t ∈ H, while for each m boxplots show
the distribution of the relative error for the different param-
eter extractions. On each box, the “red line” indicates the
median, and the bottom and top edges of the box indicate the
25th and 75th percentiles, respectively. The whiskers extend
to the most extreme data points not considered outliers, and
the outliers are plotted individually using the “+” symbol.
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Fig. 2. Normalized total consumption profile
(1/m)
∑
i∈I x
it + xˆ0t obtained by solving P (blue) and
Pa (red); Normalized non-PEV consumption xˆ0t shown in
green. As m increases these profiles tend to coincide.
is supported on nξ masses located at ξ¯
` = [γ`, x`, x`],
` ∈ L, where L = {1, . . . , nξ}, i.e.,
∑
`∈L P{ξ = ξ¯`} = 1,
for any ξ ∈ Ω.
4.1 Abstraction in homogeneous groups
In this subsection we focus on a finite number of agents
and show that, either when solving P or Pa, the deci-
sion vectors corresponding to agents that form a homo-
geneous group are identical, i.e., identical vehicles have
the same charging profile. This naturally provides a way
to abstract the overall problem, involving a possibly high
number of agents and hence decision vectors, to a prob-
lem of smaller size where we only have one decision vec-
tor per group of homogeneous agents.
For anym ≥ 1, for all i ∈ I, denote by∑i∈I 1{ξi=ξ¯`} the
number of agents that form a homogeneous group with
parameter ξ¯`, where 1{ξi=ξ¯`} is an indicator function
that is 1 if ξi = ξ¯` and 0 otherwise. For all ` ∈ L, denote
by I` = {i ∈ I : ξi = ξ¯`} the set of indices corresponding
to agents belonging to the same homogeneous group.
Note that for the single agent case (i.e., m = 1) one of
the sets I`, ` ∈ L, is singleton and all the others are
empty. This implies that there is only one term in the
square in F¯m below.
Let x¯` = [x¯`0, . . . , x¯`(h−1)]> ∈ R|H|, ` ∈ L, x¯ = (x¯1, . . . ,
x¯nξ), X¯ = X1 × . . . × X¯nξ , and consider the following
variant of P, where we only consider one decision vector
per group of homogeneous agents.
P¯ : min
x¯∈X¯
F¯m(x¯), (40)
where F¯m(x¯) =
∑
t∈H p
t(
∑
`∈L
∑
i∈I 1{ξi=ξ¯`}x¯
`t +
x0t)2, and for all ` ∈ L,
X¯` =
{
x¯` ∈ R|H| :
∑
t∈H
x¯`t = γ` and
x¯`t ∈ [x`, x`], for all t ∈ H}. (41)
Let also P¯a denote the variant of P, defined similarly
to P¯ with the difference that its objective function is
the sum of the objective function in (40) and the term∑
t∈H p
t(x¯`t)2.
Proposition 5 Consider Assumptions 1.a) and 3. Let
x¯? ∈ X¯, x¯?a ∈ X¯ be any minimizer of P¯ and P¯a, respec-
tively. For all ` ∈ L, let
xi,? = x¯`,?, for all i ∈ I`, (42)
xi,?a = x¯
`,?
a , for all i ∈ I`, (43)
Vectors x? = (x1,?, . . . , xm,?) and x?a = (x
1,?
a , . . . , x
m,?
a )
are minimizers of P and Pa, respectively.
Proof For all ` ∈ L, for all i ∈ I`, Xi = X¯`. Therefore,
since x¯? is optimal for P¯, it will be also feasible, i.e.,
x¯`,? ∈ X¯`, for all ` ∈ L. The last statement, together
with (42), leads to xi,? ∈ Xi, for all i ∈ I, which in
turn implies that x? is a feasible solution for P. Via an
analogous argument it can be shown that x?a is a feasible
solution for Pa.
By the definition of F¯m we have that
F¯m(x¯?) =
∑
t∈H
pt
(∑
`∈L
∑
i∈I
1{ξi=ξ¯`}x¯
`t,? + x0t
)2
=
∑
t∈H
pt
(∑
`∈L
∑
i∈I`
xit,? + x0t
)2
=
∑
t∈H
pt
(∑
i∈I
xit,? + x0t
)2
= Fm(x?), (44)
where the third equality is due to (42), and the last one
is due to (4). Let x = (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ X be an arbitrary
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feasible solution of P, i.e., xi ∈ Xi for all i ∈ I, and
consider x¯` = (1/n`)
∑
i∈I` x
i, for all ` ∈ L. For ` ∈ L,
since x¯` is a convex combination of {xi ∈ Xi}i∈I` , Xi =
X¯` for all i ∈ I` and X¯` is convex, x¯` ∈ X¯`. Hence,
F¯m(x¯?)≤ F¯m(x¯) =
∑
t∈H
pt
(∑
`∈L
∑
i∈I
1{ξi=ξ¯`}x¯
`t+x0t
)2
≤
∑
t∈H
pt
(∑
`∈L
∑
i∈I`
xit + x0t
)2
=
∑
t∈H
pt
(∑
i∈I
xit + x0t
)2
= Fm(x), (45)
where the first inequality is due to optimality of x¯? for
P¯, whereas the second one is due to convexity of F¯m and
the fact that it is quadratic with respect to x¯. By (44) and
(45), we have that Fm(x?) ≤ Fm(x). Since x ∈ X was
arbitrary, x? is optimal for P. To show that x?a is optimal
for Pa we follow the same derivation with (44) and (45),
appending to F¯m the term
∑
`∈L
∑
t∈H p
t(x`t)2. 2
Proposition 5 implies that it suffices to solve P¯ (sim-
ilarly for P¯a), which involves fewer decision variables
compared to P, and then construct a minimizer of P by
means of the assignment in (42). Note that (42) and (43)
enforce the same decision vector to all members of a ho-
mogeneous group. It should be noted that the result of
Proposition 5 is intuitive; as an effect of the price being
agent independent, all agents in a homogeneous group
solve exactly the same optimisation problem, thus re-
sulting to the same Nash equilibrium charging strategy.
4.2 Asymptotic effect of heterogeneity
Theorem 2 shows that the ratio between the optimal
values of P and Pa tends to one as m tends to infinity,
for almost any {ξi}i≥1, however, their individual values
may change for different values of {ξi}i≥1. For the case
of a discrete probability distribution, we show in the
following theorem that this is not the case and, as the
number of agents tends to infinity, the optimal value of
P (and hence the one of the associated game) tends to
a deterministic quantity, i.e., variability averages out as
the number of agents increases. For that particular sub-
class of problems and distributions, this result provides
support to hypothesis H ′3 in [16].
Theorem 3 Consider Assumptions 1.a) and 3. For any
m ≥ 1, let x?, x¯? be any minimizer of P and P¯, respec-
tively. We then have that
lim
m→∞
Fm(x?)
m2
=
∑
t∈H
pt
(∑
`∈L
P{ξ = ξ¯`}x¯`t,? + xˆ0t
)2
, (P-a.s.)
(46)
Proof For all ` ∈ L, by Theorem 1 with 1{ξi=ξ¯`} in place
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Fig. 3. Empirical distribution of Fm(x?)/m2, constructed by
calculating the optimal solution x? of P for 100 multi-ex-
tractions of {γi}i≥1 from a discrete uniform distribution and
xit = 0 and xit = 1 for all i ∈ I, t ∈ H. As m increases the
distribution gets concentrated around the quantity in (46).
of yi, and since E[1{ξ=ξ¯`}] = P{ξ = ξ¯`}, for all ξ ∈ Ω,
lim
m→∞
1
m
∑
i∈I
1{ξi=ξ¯`} = P{ξ = ξ¯`}, (P-a.s.) (47)
By (44) we have that Fm(x?) = F¯m(x¯?), while by the
definition of F¯m we obtain that
Fm(x?)
m2
=
∑
t∈H
pt
(∑
`∈L
∑
i∈I
1
m
1{ξi=ξ¯`}x¯
`t,? +
x0t
m
)2
,
(48)
Since (48) holds for any {ξi}i∈I , for any m ≥ 1, (47),
(48), and the fact that limm→∞ x0t/m = xˆ0t (see Section
2.1), lead to (46), and hence conclude the proof. 2
By Theorem 2 a similar statement holds for the optimal
value of Pa, as this tends to the one of P as the num-
ber of agents increases. The implication of Theorem 3
is illustrated in Figure 3. We consider the same set-up
with that of Figure 1, where xˆ0t = 0 for all t ∈ H, with
the difference that the charging levels {γi}i≥1, i ∈ I,
were extracted in an i.i.d. fashion from a discrete uni-
form distribution in [0, 12], with masses centered uni-
formly in this interval with spacing 0.01. For different
values of m, we provide the empirical probability distri-
bution of Fm(x?)/m2, where x? is calculated by solving
P. As m increases, the empirical distribution becomes
concentrated at a single value of Fm(x?)/m2, in agree-
ment with Theorem 3.
5 Concluding remarks
We quantified the price of anarchy for a class of PEV
charging control games, showing that the limiting case of
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infinite agent populations the Nash equilibrium achieves
the same value with the social welfare optimum for al-
most any choice of the random heterogeneity parameter.
Moreover, in the case where the agents’ heterogeneity
parameters follow a discrete probability distribution, we
provided a systematic way to abstract agents in homo-
geneous groups and showed that heterogeneity averages
out as the number of agents tends to infinity.
Several iterative algorithms for decentralized computa-
tion of Nash equilibria could be employed, e.g., [11, 13,
23]; in [9] a detailed analysis using the regularized Jacobi
algorithm of [11] is provided. Current work concentrates
on relaxing the requirement for an affine price function
to allow for a more general class of games like in [13],
and on incorporating distribution network models and
intertemporal charging costs in our formulation [5, 6].
Moreover, we aim at investigating the effect of hetero-
geneity in the case where the underlying probability dis-
tribution is continuous, while the result of Theorem 3
could be exploited from a system aggregator’s point of
view to steer the aggregate value of large fleets of vehi-
cles to a given deterministic quantity.
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